Abstract-Identifying attacks is key to ensure security in cyber-physical systems. In this paper we remark upon the computational complexity of the attack identification problem by showing how conventional approximation techniques may fail to identify attacks. Then, we propose decentralized and distributed monitors for attack identification with performance guarantees and low computational complexity. The proposed monitors rely on a geometric control framework, yet they require only local knowledge of the system dynamics and parameters. We exploit a divide-and-conquer approach, where first the system is partitioned into disjoint regions, then corrupted regions are identified via distributed computation, and finally corrupted components are isolated within regions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems are the core of many technological domains, including health care and biomedicine, telecommunications, and energy management. Due to their importance, cyber-physical systems are not only prone to sensor and actuator failures as legacy control systems, but also to intentional attacks against control and communications modules. Attacks can have major consequences, ranging from economic losses to instabilities and services disruption [1] , [2] , [3] .
Detection and identification of attacks is necessary to design effective security mechanisms. Fundamental limitations in the detectability and identifiability of attacks have recently been characterized for different system dynamics, attack models, and monitoring systems. For instance, in [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] it is shown how attackers with access to sufficiently many system resources can always avoid detection and identification, as well as attackers with more limited resources and full knowledge of the system dynamics and state. Conversely, if the monitoring resources and information outbalance the attack capabilities, the attack locations and strategy can be promptly reconstructed. Moreover, while detecting attacks is computationally easy in both centralized and distributed settings [4] , [8] , identifying the attack location and strategy is computationally hard [4] .
Despite its importance, few solution have been proposed for the identification of attacks. A complete, yet computationally intensive, solution to the attack identification problem is described in [4] by using unknown-input observers and geometric control techniques [9] . Convex relaxation methods are employed in [10] and without guarantees) identification algorithm for the case of attacks corrupting the system measurements. In [11] it is shown that certain instances of the identification problem can in fact be solved efficiently. Finally, decentralized state estimation and attack identification is discussed in [12] , [13] . In these decentralized approaches local control centers have sensory information and system data from within their region, and signals from other regions are either directly measured or naively treated as unknown inputs.
This paper concerns the computational complexity of the attack identification problem, and its main contributions are as follows. First, we highlight the complexity of the attack identification problem by converting it to an equivalent cardinality minimization problem. We show how and why common convex relaxation techniques for static problems aiming at circumventing the computational complexity may fail to identify attacks in dynamic systems (Section II). Our examples highlight that, in large-scale systems, different output and state attacks may achieve the same cost in relaxed optimization problems, thereby impeding their identification.
The inherent computational complexity and shortcomings of relaxation methods motivate our second contribution: we present a fully decentralized and low-complexity identification method and characterize its performance (Section III-B). Our decentralized method relies on geographically distributed control centers, which have local knowledge of the system parameters. We show that the performance of our decentralized method depends only on the system structure and parameters, and not on the attack strategy. Hence, our method also provides guidelines to design secure systems.
As third and main contribution, we propose a distributed identification method based on the divide-and-conquer principle (Section III-C). Our distributed method is based on local state estimation, cooperation with neighboring control centers, regional attack detection, and finally regional attack identification. Analogously to our decentralized method, our distributed algorithm requires only local model information and communication, and it achieves guaranteed identification of a class of attacks. Our distributed method overcomes the performance of its decentralized counterpart, at the expense of communication and a more involved algorithmic structure.
II. THE CENTRALIZED IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
In this section we present our setup for the attack identification problem, and we recall some results and fundamental limitations of centralized identification methods.
A. Centralized setup and notation
We represent a cyber-physical system under attack with the continuous-time, linear, and time-invariant system 1 x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t),
where
n×m , C ∈ R p×n , and D ∈ R p×m . The inputs Bu : R ≥0 → R n and Du : R ≥0 → R p are assumed to be unknown. Besides reflecting the genuine failure of systems components, these unknown inputs model the effect of attacks against cyber and physical components. We assume that each state and output variable can be independently compromised. Accordingly, we partition the input matrices and attack signals as B = [
T , where u x and u y are referred to as state attack and output attack, respectively. As shown in [4] , many interesting cyber-physical systems and attacks can be modeled by system (1) with unknown inputs.
The attack signal depends upon the attack strategy. In particular, if the attack set (or attacked variables) is K ⊆ {1, . . . , n + p}, with |K| = k, then only the entries of u indexed by K are nonzero over time, that is, for each i ∈ K, there exists a time t such that u i (t) = 0 and u j (t) = 0 for all j ∈ K and at all times. To underline this sparsity relation, we use u K to denote the attack signal, that is the subvector of u indexed by K. Analogously, the pair (B K , D K ), where B K and D K are the submatrices of B and D with columns in K, are referred to as the attack signature. Hence, Bu = B K u K , and Du = D K u K . Finally, we assume that the cardinality k of the attack set, or an upper bound, is known.
B. Identifiability of cyber-physical attacks
Informally, an attack K is unidentifiable if it cannot be distinguished (from knowledge of the measurements and the system parameters) from another attack R corrupting equally many or fewer variables. Here, we confine ourselves to comparing the attack set K with other attack sets R with |R| ≤ |K| since sufficiently large attack sets can always be designed to be unidentifiable, for instance, by corrupting sufficiently many sensors [14] .
More formally, let y(x 0 , u, t) be the output sequence generated from the state x 0 under the attack signal u. We adopt the following definition of identifiability of attacks [4] :
Definition 1: (Identifiability of cyber-physical attacks) For the system (1) with initial state x 0 , the at-
is unidentifiable if and only if y(x 0 , u K , t) = y(x 1 , u R , t) for some initial state x 1 ∈ R n , for some attack (B R u R , D R u R ) with |R| ≤ |K| and R = K, and for all t ∈ R ≥0 .
In [4, Theorem 3.4] , we provided the following equivalent system-theoretic characterization of identifiability: Theorem 2.1: (Algebraic test for identifiability of cyberphysical attacks) For the system (1) and an attack set K, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is unidentifiable; and (ii) there is an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R = K, some s ∈ C, and vectors g K ∈ C |K| , g R ∈ C |R| , and x ∈ C n , with x = 0, such that
Condition (2) shows the equivalence between unidentifiable attacks of cardinality k and the existence of invariant zeros for the system (A, BK, C, DK) with |K| ≤ 2k [9] .
C. Centralized identification: complexity and pitfalls
The attack identification problem is concerned with identifying the attack set K from measurements y and knowledge of the system parameters (A, C). The identification problem can be reformulated as the following cardinality minimization problem [4, Lemma 4.4] : given a system with state transition matrix A ∈ R n×n , measurement matrix C ∈ R p×n , and measurement signal y : R ≥0 → R p , find the minimum cardinality input signals v x : R ≥0 → R n and v y : R ≥0 → R p and an initial condition ξ 0 ∈ R n that explain the measurements y, that is, min vx, vy, ξ0
Here we use the shorthands supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (3) is generally combinatorial and belongs to the class of NP-hard problems [4, Corollary 4.5]. As a consequence of this inherent complexity, existing complete solutions to identify the attack set K require a combinatorial procedure, since, a priori, K is one of the residual filters [9] each determining whether a predefined set coincides with the attack set. The solution in [4] is complete, but does not scale to large attack sets.
In the case of discrete-time systems subject to output attacks, the attack identification problem can be solved efficiently if the monitoring system has access to a substantial amount of resources. The particular assumption is that the pair (A, C) remains observable after removing any set of , where the state variable 3 is corrupted by the attacker, and the state variables 2, 4, and 7 are directly measured. Due to the sparsity pattern of (A, B, C) any attack of cardinality one is generically detectable and identifiable; see [4] , [16] for further details.
can often be efficiently solved via the 1 regularization min v∈R n y − Av 1 [15] . This procedure can be adapted to problem (3) after converting it into an algebraic problem, for instance by taking subsequent derivatives of the output y, or by discretizing the continuous-time system (1) and recording several measurements. As shown in [10] , for discrete-time systems the 1 regularization performs reasonably well in the presence of output attacks. However, in the presence of state attacks such an 1 relaxation may perform poorly. In what follows we present a intuition explaining why this approach may fail, particularly in large-scale systems.
Example 1: (Ineffectiveness of regularization methods for sufficiently distant attacks) Consider a consensus system with underlying network graph (reflecting the sparsity pattern of A) illustrated in Fig. 1 . In our model (1), the system matrix A is parameterized by 0 < ε 1, and given by the Laplacian 
and U R (s) be the Laplace transforms of u K (t) and u R (t), respectively. Notice that G R (s) is right-invertible [9] . Thus, letting G −r
In other words, the measurements Y (s) generated by the attack U K (s) can equivalently be generated by the attack
, that is, the attack set K achieves a lower cost than R in the problem (3) .
Consider now the numerical realization with ε = 0.0001, x(0) = 0, and u K (t) = 1 for all t ∈ R ≥0 . The corresponding Fig. 2 we plot the attack mode u R for the attack set R = {2, 4, 7} to generate the same output as the attack set K = {3} with attack Fig. 2 . Observe that
holds point-wise in time for all integers p ≥ 1. We also have
for any integers p, q ≥ 1 and with the L q / p signal norm
Hence, the attack set R achieves a lower cost than K for any version of the optimization problem (3) penalizing a p cost point-wise in time or a L q / p cost over a time interval. On the other hand, we have u R L0 > u K L0 . We conclude that, in general, the identification problem cannot be solved by a point-wise p or L q / p regularization for any p, q ≥ 1. Finally, we remark that for any choice of network parameters, a value of ε can be found such that a point-wise p or a L q / p regularization procedure fails at identifying the attack set.
We emphasize that Example 1 is not of pathological nature, but large-scale stable systems often exhibit this behavior independently of the system parameters for attacks which are "sufficiently distant" from the sensors.
III. THE DISTRIBUTED IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
The obstacles and pitfalls in the centralized attack identification problem motivate our study of divide-and-conquer methods. In this section, we design distributed attack identification algorithms with performance guarantees, requiring low computational cost and local knowledge of the system.
A. Distributed setup and notation
Let G = (V, E) be the undirected graph associated with the matrix A, where the vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} corresponds to the system states, and the set of edges E = {(i, j) : a ij = 0} is induced by the sparsity pattern of A; see also [4, Section IV] . Assume that V is partitioned into N disjoint subsets as V = V 1 ∪ · · · ∪ V N , with |V i | = n i , and let G i = (V i , E i ) be the i-th subgraph of G with vertices V i and
According to this partition, and possibly after relabeling the states, the system matrix A in (1) can be written as
where (A 1 , . . . , A N ) , then A D represents the isolated subsystems and A C describes the interconnection structure among the subsystems. Additionally, if the original system is sparse, then several blocks in A C vanish.
We assume the following on the subsystem decomposition: (A1) the matrix C = blkdiag(C 1 , . . . , C N ) is blockdiagonal with C i ∈ R pi×ni , and each pair
i has a control center with the following capabilities: (A2) the i-th control center knows the matrices A i and C i , as well as the neighboring matrices A ij , j ∈ N i ; and (A3) the i-th control center can transmit an estimate of its state to the j-th control center if j ∈ N i . Given the above structure, the system (1) can be written as the interconnection of N subsystems of the forṁ
is the attack set in region G i , and K p i is the set of corrupted measurements in region G i . Clearly, if the inter-subsystem signals A ij x j are known or directly measured, then the regional attack identification problem within each subsystem reduces to the centralized problem. We will not make this assumption since it is restrictive and precludes the case that the inter-subsystem signals A ij x j themselves are corrupted by an attacker.
B. Fully decoupled attack identification
As a first low-complexity identification method we consider the fully decoupled case (no cooperation among control centers). In the spirit of fully decentralized state estimation [12] , the neighboring states x j affecting x i are treated as unknown inputs f i to the i-th subsystem, and equation (4) becomeṡ
. We refer to (5) as to the i-th decoupled system, and we let V b i ⊆ V i be the set of boundary nodes of (5), that is, the nodes j ∈ V i with A jk = 0 for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ V i . Due to partitioning, control centers are able to perform attack identification only on local subsystems.
Under certain identifiability assumptions (see Theorem 3.1 below), the i-th control center can uniquely identify the attack set K i by again implementing a set of residual generators (e.g., see [17] ), where the residual output is insensitive to the attack matrices B Ri and D Ri (for every attack set R i of cardinality |K i |), and to the boundary inputs B (i) the attack set K in (5) is unidentifiable by the fully decoupled identification algorithm; and (ii) for some region i ∈ {1, . . . , N } with K i = ∅, there exists an attack set R i , with
) has invariant zeros. Proof: Let y i (x i,0 , u Ki , f i , t) denote the output of system (5) at time t, with initial value x i,0 , attack input u Ki , and boundary input f i . Notice that the boundary input f i is considered arbitrary and unknown by the fully decoupled attack identification method. The attack set K i is undistinguishable from R i if and only if y(x i,0 , u Ki , f i , t) = y(x i,1 , u Ri , h i , t) at all times t, for some initial conditions x i,0 and x i,1 , attack inputs u Ki and u Ri , and boundary inputs f i and h i . Due to linearity of the system, K i is unidentifiable if and only if y(x i,0 − x i,1 , u Ki − u Ri , f i − h i , t) = 0 at all times, which can be guaranteed if and only if the quadruple [9] . In the absence of invariant zeros, identifiability of attacks is ensured as in [4] for the centralized case.
By comparing Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 we conclude that, with the fully decoupled identification procedure, the ith control center cannot distinguish between an unknown input from a safe subsystem, an unknown input from a corrupted subsystem, and a boundary attack with the same input direction.
Corollary 3.2 (Limitation of decoupled algorithm):
The following statements hold for the partitioned system (5) with the fully decoupled identification algorithm: (L1) any (boundary) attack set K i ⊆ V b i is not identifiable by the i-th control center (in fact K i is not detectable 2 ), and (L2) any (external) attack set K \ K i is not identifiable by the i-th control center (in fact K i is not detectable).
C. Cooperative attack identification
In this section we improve upon the fully decoupled method presented in Subsection III-B and propose an identifi-cation method based on a divide-and-conquer procedure with cooperation. In particular, the identification method proposed in this section differs from the fully decoupled identification method because control centers are allowed to exchange their estimates, which reduces the uncertainty due to unknown boundary inputs. In developing our method, we implicitly assume that communication among control centers is secure.
Our cooperative identification method is informally described as follows. First, control centers independently estimate the state of their local region subject to unknown inputs from the neighboring regions. Because of the presence of unknown inputs, the estimation computed by a control center is correct modulo some uncertainty subspace. Control centers exchange their estimate and the corresponding uncertainty subspaces. Second, control centers check the compatibility between their estimate and those received from the neighboring regions. Third, if the received estimates are not compatible with local estimates, then the system is recognized under attack. Finally, control centers implement a local attack identification procedure by leveraging local system parameters and estimates, and estimates received from their neighbors.
We next detail our cooperative identification method. (S1: local state estimation) Each control center estimates the state of its own region by means of an unknown-input observer for the i-th subsystem subject to the unknown input B b i f i . We adopt the technique in [9, Section 4.3.1], which exploits the derivatives of the output signal to reconstruct the system state instantaneously. In the presence of process and measurement noise, different methods should be used.
Assume that the state x i can be reconstructed modulo some subspace F i . 3 Let F i = Basis(F i ) be the uncertainty matrix, and partition the state accordingly as
wherex i (t) ⊥ F i is the portion of the state that can be estimated by the i-th control center in the presence of the unknown input B b i f i , andx i (t) ∈ F i . Let z i (t) be the estimate at time t ofx i . Notice that, if the i-th region is not corrupted, then z i (t) =x i (t), whereas it may be z i (t) =x i (t) when K i = ∅. (S2: communication) Control centers transmit their estimatê x i and uncertainty matrix F i to every neighboring control center. (S3: regional attack detection) Observe that
wherex j andx j are defined as in (6) . After carrying out step (S1), since the matrices A ij are known to the i-th control center due to Assumption (A6), only the inputs A ijxj are unknown to the i-th control center, while the inputs A ijxj are known to the i-th center due to communication. Let Transmitx i to N i , and receivex j from N i ;
5
Compute residual r i as in (7) 
, wherex is the vector ofx i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
Next, we construct a residual generator that is insensitive to the input B b i F i f i (e.g., see [17] ) and makes use of the state estimates B b i z transmitted to control center i by its neighbors:
(S4: cooperative attack identification) Neighboring control centers exchange the zero/nonzero status of the previously computed residuals, identify corrupted regions, and independently identify attacks in each attacked region. Our cooperative identification procedure for the i-th control center is summarized in Algorithm 1. We make the following technical assumptions: (A4) corrupted regions have one neighbor at distance 2, that is, |N 2 i | ≥ 1 for all regions i with K i = ∅, and (A5) corrupted regions are separated by 3 non-corrupted regions, that is, K j = ∅ for all j ∈ N 3 i and i with K i = ∅. Assumption (A4) requires a sufficiently large number of clusters, while assumption (A5) restricts our procedure to localized attacks. The next theorem characterizes the effectiveness of our cooperative identification procedure. Theorem 3.3: (Cooperative attack identification) For the partitioned system (4), the attack set K is identifiable by the cooperative identification algorithm if the following conditions hold:
(i) every system (A i , B b i , C i ) has no invariant zeros, and (ii) every system
has no invariant zeros for every attack set R i with |R i | ≤ |K i |. In Theorem 3.3, conditions (i) with assumptions (A4) and (A5) ensure regional identifiability, that is, the possibility to identify corrupted regions from local residuals and communication with neighboring regions. Condition (ii) ensures regional detectability as (7) and local identifiability, that is, attack identifiability within each corrupted region from local measurements and communication with neighboring regions. We defer the proof of Theorem 3.3 to VI-A.
We conclude this section with the following observations. First, the cooperative identification procedure is implemented only on the corrupted regions (line 7 in Algorithm 1). Thus, the combinatorial complexity of our distributed identification procedure is i=1 ni+pi |Ki| , where is the number of corrupted regions. Hence, the distributed identification procedure greatly reduces the combinatorial complexity of the centralized procedure presented in [4] that requires the implementation of n+p |K| filters. Second, the conditions in Theorem 3.3 for cooperative identification improve upon those in Theorem 3.1 for fully decoupled identification; see Section IV for an example. Third, our cooperative identification procedure is effective when attacks are localized in some regions, and regions under attack are sufficiently far from each other. Under these assumptions, our cooperative identification overcomes the limitations described in Example 1, because it does not rely on the magnitude of the measurements, and has provable performance guarantees.
Remark 1 (Extension to descriptor systems): The proposed methods can be extended to descriptor systems
where E ∈ R n×n is a singular matrix. Descriptor models are encountered in cyber-physcial systems with conservation laws such as power, gas, or water networks [4] . The following assumptions guarantee existence of non-impulsive solutions [18] : (A6) the pair (E, A) is regular, that is, the determinant |sE − A| is nonzero for almost all values s ∈ C; (A7) the initial condition x(0) ∈ R n is consistent, that is, (Ax(0) + Bu(0)) ∈ Im(E); and (A8) the input u is smooth. The characterization of identifiability (2) extends to descriptor systems [4, Theorem 3.4] , residual filters can be designed as in [4, Section IV.D] , and the state estimation step (S1) can be extended akin to [19, Appendix] .
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We now present an example showing that, contrary to the limitations of the naive fully decoupled approach (see Corollary 3.2), boundary attacks K i ⊆ V b i can be identified by our cooperative attack identification method.
Consider the sensor network in Fig. 3 , where the state of the blue nodes {2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22 , 23} is measured and the state of the red node {3} is corrupted by an attacker. Assume that the network evolves according to linear timeinvariant dynamics. Assume further that the network has been partitioned into the three areas V 1 = {1, . . . , 8}, V 2 = {9, . . . , 16}, and V 3 = {17, . . . , 24}. Since {3, 4} are the boundary nodes for the first area, the attack set K = 3 is not identifiable via the fully decoupled procedure in Section III-B; see Corollary 3.2. It can be verified that the conditions in Fig. 3 . This figure shows a network composed of three subsystems. A control center is assigned to each subsystem. Each control center knows the local dynamics. The state of the blue nodes {2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15} is continuously measured by the corresponding control center, and the state of the red node {3} is corrupted by an attacker. The decoupled identification procedure presented in Subsection III-B fails at detecting the attack. Instead, our cooperative identification procedure identifies the corrupted agent. Theorem 3.3 are verified for generic network parameters [4, Section III.B], and that the attack can be identified via our cooperative identification procedure. We conclude that our cooperative identification algorithm outperforms the naive decoupled identification algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of identifying attacks in cyber-physical systems requires a substantial computational effort. This paper shows how standard relaxation techniques may fail to identify state attacks in cyber-physical systems, and proposes two distributed algorithms with performance guarantees for attack identification by a set of geographically deployed control centers. The algorithms require local measurements, local knowledge of the system, and communication with neighboring control centers. This paper provides promising results on the distributed attack identification problem, highlights its challenges and limitations, and foster the adoption of geometric control techniques for the solution of distributed control and estimation problems.
VI. APPENDIX A. Proof of Theorem 3.3
We start with some preliminary results. Lemma 6.1: (Residual of isolated non-corrupted regions) If K i = ∅ and K j = ∅ for all j ∈ N i , then the residual r i (t) in (7) is identically zero.
Proof: Consider a region j with K j = ∅. Notice that the state estimation z j satisfies z j =x j (see paragraph (S1: local state estimation)). Because K i = ∅, from (7) we conclude that the residual r i is driven only by the input B b i F i f i . To conclude, notice that the residual generator (7) is constructed so that r i is insensitive to the signature (B (i) r i (t) = 0 at some time t ∈ R ≥0 , and (ii) either r j (t) = 0 for all j ∈ N i at all times t ∈ R ≥0 , or r j (t) = 0 for all j ∈ N i at some times t ∈ R ≥0 . Proof: The estimation computed by a control center is correct if its area is not under attack (see paragraph (S1: local state estimation)). In other words, since K j = ∅ for all j ∈ N i , it follows B
has no invariant zeros, the set K i is locally identifiable via local measurements and transmitted estimates, and statement (i) follows; see also Theorem 2.1 and [4] . To show the second statement, observe that only two cases are possible: eitherx i = z i , or x i = z i , wherex i is defined in (6) , and z i is the estimate ofx i computed by the i-th control center. For instance, if Im(B Ki ) ⊆ Im(B b i ), that is, the attack set K i lies on the boundary of the i-th area, thenx i (t) = z i (t).
In the first case,x i = z i , all residuals r j , j ∈ N i , are identically zero. In fact, since K = ∅ for all ∈ N 2 i , it follows thatx p = z p for all p ∈ N j and j ∈ N i , so that the residual r j in (7) is identically zero, as it is insensitive to the unknown inputs B b p . Consider now the second case:
j , C j ) has no invariant zeros, every residual r j , with j ∈ N i , cannot be identically zero.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.3. Proof: Consider the i-th region, and let K i = ∅. Due to conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.3, assumptions (A4) and (A5), and Lemma 6.2 we conclude that: (C1) the residual r i is not identically zero, and (C2) either r j (t) = 0 for all j ∈ N i at all times t ∈ R ≥0 , or r j (t) = 0 for all j ∈ N i at some times t ∈ R ≥0 . Consider the region p ∈ N 2 i \ N i . Due to assumption (A5) and Lemma 6.1 we conclude that: (C3) r p is identically zero.
Consider the region j ∈ N i . Due assumption (A4) and the facts (C1) and (C3), we conclude that: (C4) there exists j 1 , j 2 ∈ N j such that r j1 is identically zero, while r j2 is not identically zero (take j 1 = p and j 2 = i.).
Corrupted regions are uniquely identified as the regions satisfying (C1) and (C2). See Figure 4 for an example. Due to condition (ii) in Theorem 3.3 each set K i is locally identifiable (see also Theorem 2.1), and the statement follows. Note that (A4) is necessary. To see this, in Fig. 4 assume that region 7 is corrupted, and that the residual computed by the 8-th control center is nonzero. Since the residual computed by the 7-th control center is also nonzero, the 8-th control center cannot determine if region 7 or 8 is corrupted.
